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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
perty protection section of the no-fault law might ultimately be re-
vived by the legislature. The question remains whether the legislature
will follow the suggestion of the court, or will be content to leave
property protection outside the no-fault statute.50
Criminal Law-WIRETAPPING-CONSENTING PARTY TO CONVERSATION
RECORDED BY POLICE WITHOUT WARRANT REQUIRED To VERIFY AT
TRIAL CONSENT TO RECORDING PRIOR TO ITS ADMISSION AGAINST OTHER
PARTY TO CONVERSATION.-Tollett v. State, 272 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1973).
While jailed for possession of marijuana, Ted Tollett became
friendly with a cellmate, Jesse Davis. Captain Campbell of the Leon
County Sheriff's Department asked Davis " 'to help me with Mr. Tollett
on making a buy.' ", Although he initially refused, Davis ultimately
agreed to cooperate. After Tollett was released, Davis, under Camp-
bell's direction, telephoned him four times. Three of the calls
originated from Campbell's office, where they were recorded; Davis
placed the fourth call from the county jail while Campbell listened
on an extension. Acting upon telephoned instructions, Tollett came
to the jail allegedly to sell drugs to Davis. Later Tollett went to a
motel room to discuss the possible sale of his unborn child with a
potential buyer, who in reality was an undercover agent. The con-
versation between Tollett and the agent also was recorded. Tollett
and his wife were then charged both with attempting to sell an unborn
child and with dispensing contraband at the Leon County Jail. At
trial the state played the recorded conversations to the jury over de-
fense objections. Davis never appeared in court, nor was his absence
explained. Tollett was convicted of dispensing contraband and LSD to
a prisoner; he and his wife were convicted of attempting to sell the
unborn child.
Holding that the trial court properly allowed the recordings to be
played before the jury, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the
50. Allowance of tort claims when the value of property damage does not exceed
$550 will probably not substantially increase automobile accident litigation. The ex-
pense involved in pursuing a claim of less than $550 would almost neutralize the
potential recovery. Partly for this reason, the Chairman of the House Insurance Com-
mittee will probably recommend that the property protection section of no-fault
not be re-enacted. Chairman Birchfield believes that property protection is not an
essential part of an effective no-fault system. Interview with Representative William
Birchfield, Chairman of the House Insurance Committee, in Tallahassee, Florida, October
31, 1973.
1. 272 So. 2d at 491.
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convictions.2 The Florida Supreme Court reversed in a four-three
decision written by Justice Ervin. Jurisdiction for certiorari was
based upon a conflict between the First District Court of Appeal
decision and the Third District's decision in Walker v. State.3 The
supreme court paraphrased the rule in Walker to require that a partici-
pant to a communication recorded by the police verify at trial his
consent to the recording prior to its admission as evidence 4-a require-
ment rejected by the First District.5 The court placed primary emphasis
upon the new language of article I, section 12, of the 1968 Florida
constitution, a search and seizure provision which provides for the
exclusion of evidence obtained by "the unreasonable interception of
private communications."6 Justice Ervin concluded that when warrant-
2. Tollett v. State, 244 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
3. 222 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
4. 272 So. 2d at 494. The existence of this rule in the Third District was not
entirely clear. Justice Adkins, dissenting in Tollett, argued that corroboration was not
contested in Walker; rather, the new rule "merely adds another qualification to the
admissibility of recorded statements." Id. at 497. In fact, corroboration was not a pivotal
issue in Walker, since the consenting party did take the witness stand. Although an
earlier decision, Hajdu v. State, 189 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1966), turned
principally upon a trespass theory, the court there reversed a conviction obtained
through the efforts of a bugged informer who neither testified herself, nor recorded her
conversations with the defendant. Hajdu was interpreted in Koran v. State, 213 So. 2d
735, 736 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968), to require actual testimony by the consenting
party as to the consent. Perhaps a better characterization of the Third District's rule
is that a recording to which one party consents is admissible, and "[t]his is particularly
true when the recording is used to corroborate the testimony of [the] consenting party
to the recording." Parnell v. State, 218 So. 2d 535, 541 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
See Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972). See also Gomien v. State,
172 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
5. 244 So. 2d at 461. The district court held that Captain Campbell's testimony
regarding what Davis did rather than what he said was sufficient to establish consent
and to overcome hearsay objections. Id. In dissent, Judge Rawls considered the hearsay
rule violated and noted that the state did in fact ask Campbell whether Davis had given
consent. Id. at 462. For other First District cases, see notes 9 & 10 and accompanying
text infra.
6. FLA. CONSr. art. I, § 12, provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against the unreasonable inter-
ception of private communications by any means, shall not be violated. No war-
rant shall be issued except upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particular-
ly describing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing or
things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the nature of
evidence to be obtained. Articles or information obtained in violation of this right
shall not be admissible in evidence.
(Emphasis added.) The corresponding provision in FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rts. § 22
(1885) is virtually identical to U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
For states with similar constitutional provisions, see HAWAII CONST. art. I, § 5; ILL.
ICONs'r. art. I, § 6; N.Y. CONsr. art. I, § 12. See also art. I, § 1.05, of the proposed Dela-
ware constitution in DEL. CODE ANN. (Noncum. Supp. 1972).
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
less wiretaps are implemented, the State must authenticate consent to
the interception through the testimony of the consenting party before
the recording of the intercepted communication can be admitted as
evidence.7
Since the decision was based upon revised constitutional language,
the court noted that federal and Florida cases decided within the con-
text of the fourth amendment and the 1885 Florida constitution could
not be considered controlling.8 However, both Florida and federal
judicial decisions already have effectively written into the original
search and seizure provisions concepts similar to those now made
explicit in article I, section 12. In 1959 the First District Court of
Appeal, in Griffith v. State, 9 concluded that wiretapping-at least
where consent was not involved-could violate the search and seizure
and the self-incrimination sections of the Declaration of Rights of the
1885 Florida constitution, and that evidence so obtained would be
inadmissible at state trials.10 The Third District Court of Appeal ob-
viously incorporated the Griffith rule in adding the further require-
ment that a consenting party corroborate his consent at trial." In-
deed, the very conflict the supreme court found between the two
districts implies that both jurisdictions, while differing on the consent
issue, necessarily assumed that electronic eavesdropping becomes con-
stitutionally impermissible at some point. Otherwise, consent would
not be at issue since evidence from electronic eavesdropping would
be admissible no matter how it was obtained.
Although the United States Supreme Court initially determined
that electronic eavesdropping failed to constitute a search or seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment, 12 the Court gradually
abandoned this rule and concluded that use of electronic devices to
"seize" conversation does amount to a search.'8 As the Court noted in
7. 272 So. 2d at 496.
8. Id. at 493.
9. 111 So. 2d 282 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
10. Id. at 287. See also Barber v. State, 172 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1965). The Griffith court claimed that it was adopting the dissenting position of
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), which found no constitutional ban
on wiretapping per se. However, it affirmed the conviction on the grounds that the
police, in attaching a headset to a party-line telephone, had not "tapped" defendant's
line. This distinction was rejected in Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968), rev'g 191 So. 2d
84 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
11. See note 4 supra.
12. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
13. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967). The Court had earlier relied on a
physical trespass theory as the element that triggered fourth amendment violations.
See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); Goldman v. United States, 316
U.S. 129 (1942). Although it characterized electronic surveillance as a "trespassory
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Katz v. United States,14 "the Fourth Amendment governs not only the
seizure of tangible items, but extends as well to the recording of oral
statements.""5
While the United States Supreme Court was delineating constitu-
tional limitations upon electronic eavesdropping, it also was carving
an exception to those limitations in the area of consensual eaves-
dropping. In On Lee v. United States"6 the Court held that the fourth
amendment would not bar testimony by a government agent regarding
a defendant's statements transmitted by a device hidden on the person
of an undercover agent-even though the undercover agent himself
failed to testify." Subsequent decisions refined this approach by em-
phasizing that the defendant must assume the risk both that an in-
dividual with whom he converses might allow a third party to overhear
the conversation,' 8 and that the conversation might "be accurately
reproduced in court, whether by faultless memory or mechanical re-
cording."' 19 Only a year prior to the Court's assertion in Katz that the
fourth amendment "protects people-and not simply 'areas'-against
unreasonable searches and seizures, ' ' 20 the Court continued to em-
phasize the risk factor, by declaring in Hoffa v. United States21 that
the fourth amendment does not protect "a wrongdoer's misplaced be-
lief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing
will not reveal it."22
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area," 388 U.S. at 44, the Court in Berger
effectively rejected the physical trespass theory while declaring a New York statute
permitting court orders for eavesdropping unconstitutionally broad. Subsequently, Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), crystallized this new approach: "[T]he Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places." Id. at 351.
14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
15. Id. at 353. The natural consequence of the Katz rule was that "oral statements,
if illegally overheard, and their fruits are . . . subject to suppression." Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 171 (1969). Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
For application of the exclusionary rule to states, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378 (1968), applies the Mapp exclusionary rule to evidence
obtained by wiretapping.
16. 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
17. Id. at 753-54.
18. Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 111 (1957), stating: "Each party to a
telephone conversation takes the risk that the other party may have an extension tele-
phone and may allow another to overhear the conversation."
19. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963). Chief Justice Warren, in his
concurring opinion, argued that the recorded statements should have been admissible
only because the consenting party testified. Id. at 441.
20. 389 U.S. at 353.
21. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
22. Id. at 302. See also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Osborn v.
United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966).
For an excellent analysis of Katz in light of Hoffa (as well as of Lewis and Osborn),
see Kitch, Katz v. United States: The Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT.
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In United States v. White2 3 the Court's recognition that the fourth
amendment extends to eavesdropping converged with its qualification
that a defendant must assume the risk of electronic recording when
he discusses his illegal activities with another. Although White could
have been decided without references to Katz,21 the plurality opinion
nevertheless emphasized that Katz did not disturb the result reached
in On Lee.2 5 Stressing the misplaced confidence rule of Hoffa, where
no electronic eavesdropping was used, the Court in White concluded
that the fourth amendment required no different result "if the agent
not only records his conversations with the defendant but instantaneous-
ly transmits them electronically to other agents . . . ."26 The Court
specifically rejected any requirement that a party consenting to elec-
tronic surveillance verify his consent at trial. The Court considered
the testimony of the consenting party not critical in deciding whether
the defendant's fourth amendment rights had been violated.27
In Tollett the Florida Supreme Court used White as a point of de-
parture in comparing state and federal search and seizure provisions.
After noting that the White decision was "sharply divided,' '2 8 the
court compared the fourth amendment of the federal Constitution with
article I, section 12, of the Florida constitution and concluded: "In
Florida, at least, the protection of privacy in the areas of communica-
tions is constitutionally mandated in express language. ' '2 9 Thus the
court decided that federal case law, including White, was not con-
trolling. Instead, Tollett placed corroboration of a party's consent
squarely within a state constitutional framework. The court insisted
that this consent "must be shown through proper testimony-not
hearsay. ' ' 30 If the consenting party does testify, then he "can include as
REv. 133. The author anticipates the ruling in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 754
(1971), in concluding, "The brave, broad reading of the Fourth Amendment in Katz has
a hollow ring when tested against the Court's work of the prior Term." Id. at 152.
Perhaps the definitive history of the consent issue through Katz is Greenawalt, The
Consent Problem in Wiretapping and Eavesdropping: Surreptitious Monitoring with
the Consent of a Participant in a Conversation, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 189 (1968).
23. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
24. The events in White antedated the Katz holding, which was held not retroactive
under the doctrine of Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969). Only four Justices
joined in the White opinion. Justice Brennan concurred in White solely on the basis
of retroactivity. 401 U.S. at 755. Justice Black concurred because of his belief, ex-
pressed in Katz, that the fourth amendment does not encompass eavesdropping at all.
Id. at 754.
25. 401 U.S. at 750.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 754.
28. 272 So. 2d at 492; see note 24 supra.
29. 272 So. 2d at 493. See note 6 supra for the express language of article I, §
12.
30. 272 So. 2d at 494.
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a logical concomitant to his testimony any tape or electronic record-
ings of such communications . . . .", Otherwise, the original acquisi-
tion of those recordings in the absence of a warrant would be "un-
reasonable" within the language of the new article I, section 12.32
The court disposed of another apparent problem, a provision of
Florida's new security of communications statute which requires court
authorization for "the interception of wire or oral communications
when none of the parties to the communication has consented to the
interception .... .33 The obvious converse of this provision is that
when one of the parties consents, no court authorization is required.
4
Although it may have been unnecessary, 35 the Tollett court analyzed
the above-quoted provision. It found that the "language should not
be interpreted to obviate the necessity of a police officer securing a
warrant" unless the consenting party himself testifies.
36 The court
determined that the provision did not remove the corroboration re-
quirement; rather, the provision was "in keeping with the intent of
the new verbiage" of article I, section 12.37
During the last several years, over half the states have also passed
new eavesdropping statutes.38 A minority impose warrant require-
31. id.
32. Id. at 493. Article I, § 12 is set forth in note 6 supra.
33. FLA. STAT. § 934.01(4) (1971).
34. See FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(c) (1971), which provides:
It is not unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to
intercept a wire or oral communication when such person is a party to the
communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior
consent to such interception.
Subsection (d) applies the same exception to those "not acting under color of law .. .
unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal
act."
35. According to the petitioner's statement of facts, the interceptions took place in
April 1969. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 5. The security of communications
statute did not become effective until September 1 of the same year.
36. 272 So. 2d at 494.
37. Id. The court drew an analogy to search warrants:
"Consents" from police informers with no substantial or requisite interest in the
residence or papers or personal effects of a suspect are not legally sufficient to
relieve police officers of the necessity of securing search warrants to search the
dwelling, person or papers and effects of the suspect; neither should their "con-
sents" except under the safeguards of authentication as hereinafter noted be
sufficient to obviate the necessity of securing a warrant for intercepting wire or
oral communications.
Id.
38. See notes 39-41, 43 infra. The following thirteen states have eavesdropping statutes
which are more than twenty years old (except for minor modifications); a few date
back to the nineteenth century: ALA. CODE tit. 48, § 414 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 73-
1810 (1957); IDAHO CODE § 18-6705 (1948); IOWA CODE ANN. § 716.8 (1971); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 433.430 (1971); LA. REV. STAT. § 14.332 (1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-155 (1969);
1974]
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ments upon the interception of all communications." A few other states
exempt law enforcement officials from an otherwise comprehensive
prohibition when one party consents to the interception.40 A majority
of the new statutes,4 as well as the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968,42 after which many statutes are patterned,"
N.D. CENT. CODE § 8-10-07 (1959); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1757 (1958); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 65-2117 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-48-11 (1953); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-156
(1960); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 37-259 (1957).
Six states have never had eavesdropping statutes: Indiana, Mississippi, Missouri,
South Carolina, Texas and West Virginia. Hawaii's statute was repealed. See note 39
infra.
39. NEv. REV. STAT. § 200.620 (1971); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2 (Supp.
1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.73.030 (Supp. 1972). See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 712 (Supp. 1973), which authorizes interceptions with consent, but makes the
evidence therefrom excludable. Cf. State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court, 187 N.W.2d 354
(Wis. 1971), discussed p. 195 infra.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-12-1(C) (1972) prohibits overhearing a "communica-
tion . . . intended for another . . . without his consent." Recently enacted warrant
requirements do not mention consent. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40A-12-1.1 to .10 (Supp.
1973).
Two statutes have been interpreted to require the consent of all parties: MD. ANN.
CODE art. 35, § 93 (1971), in Robert v. State, 151 A.2d 737 (Md. 1959), and the some-
what older OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1757 (1958), in Cameron v. State, 365 P.2d 576
(Okla. Crim. App. 1961).
Three statutes formerly prohibited eavesdropping without the consent of all parties.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-2 (Smith-Hurd 1964), as amended, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §
14-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972) prohibited eavesdropping "without the consent of any party";
the legislature changed this to "any one party" in 1969. Haw. Laws 1967, ch. 209,
§ 2(a)(l) (repealed 1973) prohibited interceptions without the consent of "both the
sender and the receiver." The rest of the act was repealed as well, leaving Hawaii at
present with no eavesdropping statute at all. Pa. Laws 1957, ch. 411, § I (repealed
1972) prohibited interceptions "without the permission of the parties .... ." Common-
wealth v. McCoy, 275 A.2d 28 (Pa. 1971), interpreted this to mean all parties. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 5702(3) (Purdon 1973) now requires "the consent of the sender or re-
ceiver."
40. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 632(b), 633 (West 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 1336
(Noncum. Supp. 1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 99(B)(4) (1970). In People v.
Murphy, 503 P.2d 594, 105 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1972), the court in dicta approved the White
principle that the informant need not testify.
Two states prohibit interception without the consent of all parties, but in a vague
fashion allow authorized interceptions. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 750.539c,
750.539g(a) (1968); MONT. CRIM. CODE § 94-8-114(c) (1973).
41. ALASKA STAT. § 11.60.290(1) (1970); Auxz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1052(1) (Supp.
1973); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-28(1) (Supp. 1967); CONN. GEN. ANN. § 53a-187(a)(1)
(1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3006 (1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 14-2 (Smith-
Hurd 1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4001(l)(c) (Supp. 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.02,
subd. 2(c) (Supp. 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 86-702(2)(b) (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:156A-
4(b) (1971); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. LAW § 700.05(3) (McKinney 1971); OnIo REV. CODE ANN. §
2933.58(B) (Page Supp. 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. § 165.540(5) (1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 5702(3) (Purdon 1973); R.I. GKN. LAws ANN. § 11-35-21(c)(2) (Supp. 1972); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-13A-2 (Supp. 1973); Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 968.31(2)(b) (1971).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1970).
43. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626A.02, subd. 2(c) (Supp. 1973); S.D. COMPILED
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exempt from warrant requirements the interception of a communi-
cation when one of the parties consents. Florida's statute is typical of
the majority position. 44
Whether other states will adopt Florida's corroboration approach
to the consent provisions is uncertain, since most of the state statutes
have not yet been interpreted. Arguably, the new statutes contain
their own restrictions upon the extent of the consent exception. For
example, in Tollett the court implied that the statute and the new
constitutional provisions complement each other, so that consent must
be corroborated by testimony, not hearsay.4 5 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court announced a stricter standard in State ex rel. Arnold v. County
Court.4 6 Interpreting a Wisconsin provision similar to the federal
statute,4 7 the court said: "This section does not 'authorize' intercep-
tions when one of the parties to the conversation has given prior con-
sent but merely states such interception is 'not unlawful.' "48 The Wis-
consin court noted that the only "authorized" interceptions would
be those accomplished through court order. Therefore, though the
police could not be prosecuted for their actions, neither could they
have the recordings introduced as evidence.
49
In the developing law of consensual electronic eavesdropping, the
primary issue has been whether court authorizations are in fact
necessary at all. White, and the majority of the new statutes, seem
to have settled the issue in most jurisdictions. Tollett offers an im-
portant qualification to the consent exception.
Under the Hoffa "misplaced trust" rule a criminal runs the risk
that an "accomplice" may be an informer. White extends the "risk"
to include the possibility that the accomplice will not testify, but that
a recording made with his consent will be introduced instead. Funda-
mental to the White rationale is the principle that confidence mis-
takenly placed in an informer creates no reasonable expectation of
privacy entitled to constitutional protection .5  Tollett follows Hoffa,
without extending the misplaced trust rule, by allowing the introduc-
tion of any recording or testimony based upon a "consent" intercep-
LAWs ANN. § 23-13A-2 (Supp. 1973).
44. The Florida provision is set forth in note 34 supra.
45. 272 So. 2d at 494.
46. 187 N.W.2d 354 (Wisc. 1971). But see State v. Wigley, 502 P.2d 819, 823 (Kans.
1972) (rejecting Arnold).
47. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 968.31(2)(b) (1971). For virtually identical provisions, see
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1971); FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(c) (1971).
48. 187 N.W.2d at 358.
49. Id.
50. 401 U.S. at 752.
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ton, but only if the consenting party is present in court.51 Unless the
consenting party testifies, the court's determination of the reasonable-
ness of the expectation of privacy by either party to the conversation
will be influenced solely by self-serving statements introduced by the
state that the police had obtained consent to the eavesdropping. 52
Without the presence of the consenting party the defense might be
unable to refute the assertion of a police officer that consent was given
voluntarily. The defendant might find himself forced to testify in an
attempt to place the conversation in context. By placing the consenting
party on the stand, the defendant might be able to discredit him, dis-
prove his consent or establish a defense, such as the entrapment de-
fense suggested in Tollett.5
The Tollett requirement of either a court order or corroboration
by the consenting party could have another effect. A law enforcement
officer planning to use a bugged informer may wish to obtain a court
authorization if he doubts that the informer will be available at trial.
Thus the requirement that the consenting party verify his consent
may lead to the same result as would a blanket requirement for court
approval of all wiretaps: rather than risk its case upon the appearance
of an informant, the state may feel compelled to secure a court au-
thorization for all consenual interceptions. 54
Other jurisdictions may be unwilling to find a corroboration re-
quirement either based upon their constitutional prohibitions upon
search and seizure or in their statutory law relating to eavesdropping.,5
Nevertheless, one might argue that the absence of the consenting party
from trial constitutes a denial of due process. In Tollett the court
observed that "fundamental fairness-at least in view of the new pro-
visions of Section 12 ... -dictates [that] Davis should have been pro-
duced by the State as a witness .... "56 White cautioned that the in-
51. 272 So. 2d at 494. The court considered it "an elementary rule of evidence"
that a party can testify as to his conversations with the defendant, and that the testi-
mony "can include as a logical concomitant . . . any tape or electronic recordings of
such communications . . ." that he has made or has authorized to be made. However,
if there is no testimony, the constitution requires an appropriate warrant. id.
52. See 244 So. 2d at 462 (Rawls, J., dissenting).
53. 272 So. 2d at 495.
54. The state raised this possibility in arguing for a rehearing. Petition for Re-
hearing at 5.
55. Only three state constitutions (and Delaware's proposed constitution) have
search and seizure provisions similar to those of Florida. See note 6 supra. For statutory
material, see notes 38-41 supra.
56. 272 So. 2d at 495. The court made an analogy to the principles in Spataro v.
State, 179 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1965), and Roviaro v. United States, 353
U.S. 53 (1957). In Roviaro the government refused to disclose the identity of an informer
who, the court ruled, was so closely connected with the defendant's arrest as to make
his testimony "highly material" to establishing certain defenses, including entrapment.
[Vol. 2
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former's "unavailability at trial and proferring the testimony of other
agents may raise evidentiary problems or pose issues of prosecutional
misconduct with respect to the informer's disappearance."57 The Ameri-
can Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Jus-
tice, while approving the consent exception," voiced a similar warning
that "serious abuses" might result:
Where [electronic surveillance techniques] are employed, for
example, to avoid having to place an informant on the stand
whose full testimony might establish a defense of entrapment ...
a court might quite properly limit their use to corroboration.59
The court's decision in Tollett eliminates speculation over whether
testimony by the absent party could have aided the defendant; thus the
decision avoids problems of "fairness" of the proceeding. It provides
a practical solution to the problem of consensual interceptions while
balancing the sometimes competing interests of protecting privacy
and catching criminals.
Criminal Law-EVIDENCE-PRIOR CRIME EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE ONLY
WHEN RELEVANT TO CRIME CHARGED-Davis V. State, 276 So. 2d 846
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973), aft'd, No. 43,874 (Fla., Feb. 15, 1974).
After a jury trial Cullen Davis was convicted of robbery and
sentenced to ten years in prison. At the trial an employee of a clean-
ing establishment testified that the defendant and another man had
robbed her of five dollars at gunpoint on December 27, 1971. The
state then profferred further testimony of a separate and independent
armed robbery; that testimony was admitted over defense counsel's
objection. The testimony consisted of two eyewitness accounts of
an armed robbery of a food store on December 22, 1971, which had
been perpetrated by a lone man wearing a woman's bikini pants
Also, another government agent overheard and testified about a conversation between
the informer and the defendant, thereby preventing the defense from using the informer
to "controvert, explain or amplify" the agent's report. Id. at 63, 64.
57. 401 U.S. at 754; cf. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 445 (1963) (concurring
opinion of Warren, C. J.), discussed in note 19 supra.
58. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE § 4.1 (Approved Draft 1971).
59. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE §§ 4.1, 4.2, Commentary, at 127-28 (Tent. Draft 1968). The
commentary calls this "an extrinsic abuse of an evidence gathering technique not
otherwise intrinsically objectionable," id. at 128, thus making it similar to both the
Tollett hearsay exception and the Roviaro fundamenta! fairness principle.
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